Controllable SecureWatermarking Technique for Tradeoff Between Robustness and Security

Controllable SecureWatermarking Technique for Tradeoff

Between Robustness and Security

ABSTRACT:

The circular watermarking (CW) technique has attracted increasing attention because it can resist the estimation of secret carriers in the watermarked only attack (WOA) framework. However, the existing CW schemes are not applicable whenever a malicious watermark removal attack can take place. This is because they either have low security because the attacker can disclose the embedding subspace or have low robustness. Based on an existing CW scheme called transportation natural watermarking (TNW), this correspondence presents a new CW technique for the tradeoff between robustness and security, which we refer to as controllable secure watermarking (CSW). The idea behind the CSW is that by altering the host signal in the orthogonal complement of the embedding subspace, we can make the watermarked signal have an orthogonally invariant distribution in a higher dimensional subspace including the embedding subspace. Orthogonally invariant distribution essentially requires that the distribution does not change if multiplied by any freely chosen orthogonal matrix, and the higher dimensional subspace is referred to as invariant subspace. We prove that the attacker can only reduce the uncertainty of secret carriers up to the invariant subspace. The dimension of the invariant subspace can be used for the tradeoff between robustness and security. Further, the experiment results show that the robustness–security tradeoff provided by the CSW is efficient. In particular, with the increase of the dimension of the invariant subspace, the security of the CSW will increase quickly while its robustness will only decrease slowly.

EXISTING SYSTEM:

The spread spectrum (SS) watermarking is one of most widely used watermarking techniques. In terms of their security, the existing SS watermarking schemes can be classified into the following three categories:

1) The classical SS watermarking schemes, such as additive SS watermarking, attenuated SS watermarking, and improved SS (ISS) watermarking. For this category of SS watermarking schemes, the attacker can disclose the secret carriers up to a signed permutation. Moreover, the accidental knowledge of watermark messages in few watermarked signals might remove this ambiguity. As a result, the attacker has the capacity for full access to the watermarking channel, and can carry out various malicious attacks, including unauthorized embedding, unauthorized detection, and unauthorized removal attack.

2) The key-secure circular watermarking (CW) schemes, such as the key-secure version of natural watermarking (NW), the key-secure version of transportation natural watermarking (TNW), and the circular extension of ISS (CW-ISS). For this category of SS watermarking schemes, the attacker can disclose the secret carriers up to the embedding subspace. This implies that the attacker cannot carry out the unauthorized embedding attack, but can remove the watermark with low distortion. For example, in, the authors presented a method for removing the watermark with low distortion by nullifying the watermarked signal’s projection on the estimated embedding subspace. Therefore, this category of SS watermarking schemes is not applicable whenever a malicious watermark removal attack can take place.

3) The stego-secure CW schemes, namely the stego-secure version of NW and the stego-secure version of TNW. For this category of SS watermarking schemes, the attacker cannot reduce the uncertainty of secret carriers. However, this category of S watermarking schemes has relatively low robustness.

DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM:

When a malicious watermark removal attack can take place, the existing SS watermarking schemes are not applicable.

PROPOSED SYSTEM:

We present a new watermarking technique called controllable secure watermarking (CSW), which is based on the TNW embedding. In the embedding subspace, the CSW alters the host signal by using the embedding rule of TNW. In addition, the CSW also alters host signal in the orthogonal complement of embedding subspace such that the watermarked signal has an orthogonally invariant distribution in a higher dimensional subspace including the embedding subspace, which we refer to as invariant subspace. The dimension of the invariant subspace can take any integer from the dimension of the embedding subspace to the length of host signal.

ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM:

We prove that the attacker can only reduce the uncertainty of secret carriers up to the invariant subspace. By choosing the dimension of invariant subspace, we can control the performance of the CSW from the view of the tradeoff between robustness and security.

MODULES:

·        Distortion

·        Robustness

·        Security

·        Tradeoff  Between Security and Robustness

MODULES DESCRIPTION:

Distortion

Generally, watermarking involves the selection of a watermark carrier, and the design of two complementary processes: embedding and decoding. In the registration, we collect the watermark signature... The watermark embedding process inserts the information by a slight modification of some property of the carrier. The watermark decoding process detects and extracts the watermark (equivalently, determines the existence of a given watermark). To correlate encrypted connections, we propose to use the inter-packet timing as the watermark carrier property of interest. The embedded watermark bit is guaranteed to be not corrupted by the timing perturbation. If the perturbation is outside this range, the embedded watermark bit may be altered by the attacker.

Robustness

In practice, the number of packets available is the fundamental. Limiting factor to the achievable effectiveness of our watermark based correlation. This set of experiments aim to compare and evaluate the correlation effectiveness of our proposed active watermark based correlation and previous passive timing-based correlation under various timing perturbations. By embedding a unique watermark into the inter-packet timing, with sufficient redundancy, we can make the correlation of encrypted flows substantially more robust against random timing perturbations.

Security

The watermark tracing approach exploits the observation that interactive connections are bidirectional. The idea is to watermark the backward traffic (from victim back to the attacker) of the bidirectional attack connections by slightly adjusting the timing of selected packets. If the embedded watermark is both robust and unique, the watermarked back traffic can be effectively correlated and traced across stepping stones, from the victim all the way back to the attacker, assuming the attacker has not gained full control on the attack target, the attack Target will initiate the attack tracing after it has detected the attack. Specifically, the attack target will watermark the backward traffic of the attack connection, and inform across the network about the watermark. The stepping stone across the network will scan all traffic for the presence of the indicated watermark, and report

To the target if any occurrences of the watermark are detected.

Tradeoff  Between Security and Robustness

One simple technique to achieve this is to use a secret key to generate a pseudo-random sequence of numerical values and add them to either or both of and for the pixels in the watermarking area. This technique is hereinafter referred to as parameter randomization.

This parameter exchange does not affect the effectiveness of lossless recoverability, because we can now recover the original pixel values by the compound mappings. We will refer to this technique in the sequel as mapping randomization. We may also combine this technique with the parameter randomization technique to enhance the security.Finally, the Authenticated user take the file in zip format with proper password.

HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS:

•                     SYSTEM                      : Pentium IV 2.4 GHz

•                     HARD DISK                : 40 GB

•                     FLOPPY DRIVE         : 1.44 MB

•                     MONITOR                   : 15 VGA colour

•                     MOUSE                        : Logitech.

•                     RAM                             : 256 MB

•                     KEYBOARD               : 110 keys enhanced.

SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS:

•                     Operating system         :-  Windows XP Professional

•                     Front End                     :-  Microsoft Visual Studio .Net 2008

•                     Coding Language         : - C# 2008.

REFERENCE:

Jian Cao and Jiwu Huang, “Controllable SecureWatermarking Technique for Tradeoff Between Robustness and Security”, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 7, NO. 2, APRIL 2012.